Use hash for github action #42
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Hello @acronhub, I'm Gemini Code Assist1! I'm currently reviewing this pull request and will post my feedback shortly. In the meantime, here's a summary to help you and other reviewers quickly get up to speed!
Summary of Changes
Hello! Gemini here, providing a summary of this pull request to help everyone get up to speed quickly.
This PR, authored by @acronhub, aims to enhance the security posture of the project's GitHub Actions workflows. The core intent, as indicated by the title and description, is to "pin" the versions of the GitHub Actions being used, likely by referencing specific commit hashes instead of mutable tags (like v1 or main). This practice mitigates risks associated with supply chain attacks on GitHub Actions, as highlighted by the linked Wiz blog post.
The provided patch context primarily shows an update to the CHANGELOG.md file, documenting this change. The actual modifications to the workflow files (.github/workflows/) that implement the pinning are not included in the provided patch data, but are the implied main change of this PR.
Highlights
- Security Improvement: The primary goal is to improve the security of the CI/CD pipeline by using more secure references for GitHub Actions.
- Pinning GitHub Actions: The PR implements the practice of pinning GitHub Actions, likely to specific commit hashes, to prevent unexpected or malicious changes from upstream action repositories.
- Changelog Update: The
CHANGELOG.mdfile has been updated to record the addition of pinning GitHub Actions.
Changelog
- CHANGELOG.md
- Added an entry under the '### Added' section to document the pinning of github actions.
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Pin the hash, avoid the wiles.
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Code Review
This pull request proposes to enhance security by pinning GitHub Actions to specific commit SHAs, a commendable goal, as highlighted by the title and description. The changelog has been updated to reflect this change.
However, a critical review point, detailed in the comment on CHANGELOG.md, is that the actual implementation of pinning actions within the GitHub workflow files appears to be missing from this pull request. For this PR to achieve its stated security objective, the necessary workflow modifications need to be included and reviewed.
Summary of Findings
- Incomplete Implementation: Missing GitHub Action Pinning: The PR updates the changelog to reflect that GitHub Actions have been pinned. However, the crucial changes to the workflow files to actually implement this pinning (e.g., by replacing version tags with commit SHAs like
actions/checkout@abcdef1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef12) are missing. This is a critical issue as the PR does not currently achieve its primary security enhancement goal, and the changelog would be misleading.
Merge Readiness
This pull request is not ready to be merged in its current state. The primary concern is the absence of the actual GitHub Actions workflow modifications that implement the pinning to commit SHAs. While the changelog update is present, it describes a change that hasn't been implemented in the codebase within this PR.
I strongly recommend that the author includes the necessary workflow file changes. Once these are added, the PR can be re-reviewed to ensure the security enhancement is correctly implemented. As a reviewer, I am not authorized to approve pull requests; further review and approval by other team members will be necessary after the concerns are addressed.
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This changelog entry states that GitHub Actions have been pinned, which is an important security improvement.
However, the actual changes to the GitHub workflow files (e.g., in .github/workflows/) that implement this pinning by using full commit SHAs for actions seem to be missing from this pull request.
Could you please verify if these workflow modifications were intended to be part of this PR and include them? Without the corresponding changes to the action configurations, this changelog entry would not accurately reflect the state of the CI/CD pipeline's security.
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Pull Request Overview
This PR enhances security by pinning GitHub Actions to specific commit SHAs, mitigating supply chain risks.
- Updated CHANGELOG to document the pinning of GitHub Actions
- Pinned
actions/checkoutandruby/setup-rubyto exact commit hashes in all workflows - Added version comments alongside each SHA for clarity
Reviewed Changes
Copilot reviewed 4 out of 4 changed files in this pull request and generated no comments.
| File | Description |
|---|---|
| CHANGELOG.md | Added entry for pinning GitHub Actions |
| .github/workflows/test.yml | Replaced action tags with commit hashes |
| .github/workflows/tag_and_release.yml | Replaced action tags with commit hashes |
| .github/workflows/lint.yml | Replaced action tags with commit hashes |
Comments suppressed due to low confidence (2)
CHANGELOG.md:7
- [nitpick] Changelog entries should use consistent casing for proper nouns. Consider updating this to “Pin GitHub Actions” to match project style.
+- Pin github actions
.github/workflows/test.yml:20
- [nitpick] This commit SHA is repeated across multiple workflows. Consider centralizing these pins using YAML anchors or a reusable workflow to simplify future updates.
- - uses: actions/checkout@v2
What
Refs
GitHub Action supply chain attack: reviewdog/action-setup | Wiz Blog